Project Camelot, Counterinsurgency, and Knowledge Production

Since the publication of Gabriel Rockhill’s book Who Paid the Pipers of Western Marxism?, more and more people are talking about the theory industry and its counterinsurgent tendencies. However, theory is just the tip of the iceberg when we consider the relationship between empirical and theoretical studies in the social sciences that are aimed at studying social movements and insurgencies in order to effectively prevent, isolate, and destroy them. When we also consider the role the US played in institutionalizing the social sciences in Latin America and in the so-called postcolonial world, restructuring university governance structures, and designing curriculum, we’re able to see the geopolitics of knowledge in a different light, one that is not solely focused on co-opting radical thought but also on disseminating dominant theories and methodologies aimed at studying resistance and the material conditions in which it emerges.

When we consider knowledge production’s counterinsurgent role, examining theory alone is insufficient, since there are concrete forms that may be overlooked in the process, such as the material ways all disciplines, including in the natural sciences, have been used to strengthen imperialism These include the material ways all sciences have been used to strengthen imperialism: from population control projects in demography and medical science, to the ideological warfare of psychology and pedagogy, to sociological and anthropological studies of the social and cultural factors of resistance, to archaeological studies that create “facts on the ground” to justify settler colonial dispossession, not to mention the production of technologies of violence (autonomous killing machines, surveillance, bombs, etc).

The theory industry is nonetheless important, as it can co-opt, dilute, and defang the most radical intellectual traditions. However, we must view knowledge production in relation to imperialism in broader terms to avoid mistaking the trees for the forest. I fear that an overemphasis on co-opted radical theory risks presenting concepts in idealist terms, where theories themselves constitute a world where insurgent resistance is apparently no longer possible, rather than situating dominant knowledge production in the US as a geopolitical and material counterinsurgent praxis with very real consequences for those on the receiving end of colonial and racial capitalist violence who choose insurgency over political, economic, cultural, and intellectual dependency.

The following text is just one example of the long history between knowledge production, counterinsurgency, and US imperialism.

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In July of 1964, the Chief of Research and Development, Department of the Army, requested that Special Operations Research Office (SORO) of the American University develop a plan under the terms of its contract ARO-7 for research “to test the feasibility of developing a social systems model which will give the following capabilities:

1. Measurement of internal war potential: a means for identifying, measuring and forecasting the potential for internal war.

2. Estimation of reaction effects: a means for estimating the relative effectiveness of various military and quasi-military postures, practices, and levels of military involvement over a wide range of environmental conditions.

3. Information collection and handling systems: means and procedures for rapid collection, storage and retrieval of data on internal war potential and effects of governmental action, with appropriate consideration of existing and likely future facilities for processing and analysis.

The present document gives a summary of actions taken since that request and provides a plan for the accomplishment of the research.

REQUIREMENT FOR PROJECT CAMELOT

A. The U.S. Army counterinsurgency mission places broad responsibilities on the Army for planning and conducting operations involving a wide spectrum of sociopolitical problems which are integral parts of counterinsurgency operations. The Army must, therefore, develop doctrines based on sound knowledge of the problem areas.

The problem of insurgency is an integral part of the larger problem of the emergence of the developing countries and their transition toward modernization. Some of these countries are just emerging into a new era of economic and social development; some are ruled or controlled by oligarchies which, in order to maintain their own favored positions, resist popular social and political movements toward economic or social betterment and removal of frustrations; still others have only recently obtained political independence. In the past, an insurgency has been perceived primarily, if not entirely, as a matter of internal security in the nation concerned to be countered when it became overt by military and police actions. In the present framework of modernization, however, the indicated approach is to try to obviate the need for insurgency through programs for political, economic, social, and psychological development. Military support of such programs can be a significant factor in the nation-building process.

Responsibility for conducting counterinsurgency operations must rest with the indigenous government. Carefully applied assistance and advice by U.S. governmental agencies can, however, materially influence the outcome. U.S. Government agencies abroad coordinate their activities through the country team which in many countries concentrates on providing assistance in developing plans and programs for preventing or countering insurgency. The programs recommended to the indigenous government may include advice on (1) the use of military force, (2) police activities, (3) educational programs, (4) social improvement programs, et cetera. The U.S. military must be prepared to participate in developing these plans and programs.

The most fruitful efforts would be those designed to achieve early detection and prevention of the predisposing conditions. Responsibility for planning such efforts should be shared by all governmental agencies. The exclusive responsibilities of the Army as a part of the military component of the country team planning committee must be considered in the context of the over-all counterinsurgency problem.

In this context, counterinsurgency operations seek to create an environment of security and popular trust which will promote orderly progress toward achieving national and popular goals. It is far more effective and economical to avoid insurgency through essentially constructive efforts than to counter it after it has grown into a full-scale movement requiring drastically greater effort.

Although U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine during the past few years has stressed preventive measures, the scientific knowledge on which to base such doctrine has been weak. Questions and answers about causes of insurgency have frequently been stated in terms unrelated to the way in which social groups and forces interact in determining the capability of the society to exist as a reasonably integrated whole.

That there is a poverty of knowledge in this area is understandable. Social science resources have not yet been adequately mobilized to study social conflict and control. A recent survey indicated that less than 1% of social scientists listedsocial conflict as their primary area of interest and less than 2% listed social control. The amiount of research in this area sponsored by the military has been relatively insignificant.

Projects have often been in the form of discrete studies focused on some problems that have been sharpened by recent operational failures. There has been no large-scale attempt to analyze comprehensively the interrelated processes of social conflict and social control.

If the U.S. Army is to perform effectively its part in the U.S. mission of counterinsurgency it must recognize that insurgency represents a breakdown of social order and that the social processes involved must be understood. Conversely, the processes which produce a stable society must also be understood. Indeed, the study of insurgency should encompass the whole social process.

B. Throughout, the work of Project Camelot will be characterized by an orientation which views a country and its problems as a complex social system.

A country, viewed as a social system, is made up of many different and interdependent groups of people in pursuit’ of various goals. When groups fail to function so as to provide for the needs of the people that make up these groups, there is a tendency for them to break down and for their symbols to change meaning or lose value. People then tend to become involved in other lines of action which they perceive to be leading to a change for the better. Such actions may include sabotage, wildcat strikes, shootings and other acts of violence which, when continued, lead to a breakdown of law and order, to an inability of the economy to provide regularly for minimum essential needs and services, and to a further discrediting of the holders of political power. Much of this sort of action comes under the label of insurgency. There are many “explanations” of insurgency and prescriptions for dealing with it and its precursors. Many of these explanations and prescriptions derive trom good but limited information and analysis and often reflect a specific point of view, such as economic or psychological, to the exclusion of others.

This project will differ from other efforts to study the symptoms and causes of insurgency, and methods of dealing with it and its preconditions, not only in size and scope but in insisting from the start upon a careful analysis of all components of the problem, and in bringing to bear in a coordinated effort the research talents of the relevant disciplines. This means calling on the resources of sociologists, psychologists, anthropologists, mathematicians, economists, political scientists, and military men.

The end product and other outputs of the project may be specified as follows:

1. Project Camelot has as its main objective an evaluation of the feasibility of developing and implementing a dynamic social systems model to:

a. Identify indicators of conditions and trends which, if continued, would probably lead to the outbreak of internal war.

b. Determine the probable effects of various courses of action by the indigenous government upon the social processes in the indigenous culture.

c. Maintain information on the conditions referred to in a. and b. above in such a way, including the specifying of dynamic interrelationships among classes of information and the societal elements represented thereby as to provide a timely and reliable basis for planning and policy guidance.

2. In the course of the project, intensive analysis of a single country will be made as a part of the effort to ascertain the feasibility of conducting similar studies on a continuing basis.

3. The main objective (1 above) will be sought through the pursuit of a number of other objectives instrumental to it. This will consist mainly in the development and testing of models of social processes and subsystems which are believed to be essential components of the processes and problems of internal war. Such model development will have three major advantages:

a. It will provide guidance to the research.

b. It will provide a framework of relationships which will serve to integrate findings and translate data into a form which may have operational utility.

c. It will serve as a protection against the distinct possibility that no all-encompassing model of a dynamic social system can be achieved in the course of this project.

4. The project will also produce conceptual and theoretical papers and reports of specific studies conducted during the course of the project. Many of these will be of immediate interest or educational value within and without the Army. A large number will be important as contributions to scientific literature and as resources which will facilitate the work of this project. These intermediate research products are discussed later.